| PDF Pages<\/th>\n | PDF Title<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9<\/td>\n | Scope Normative references <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 10<\/td>\n | Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms Key concepts of ISO\u00a026262 Functional safety for automotive systems (relationship with <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 12<\/td>\n | Item, system, element, component, hardware part and software <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 13<\/td>\n | Relationship between faults, errors and failures <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 14<\/td>\n | Selected topics regarding safety management Work product Confirmation measures General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 15<\/td>\n | Functional safety assessment <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 17<\/td>\n | Understanding of safety cases Interpretation of safety cases <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 18<\/td>\n | Safety case development lifecycle Concept phase and system development General Example of hazard analysis and risk assessment General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 19<\/td>\n | Analysis 1 Analysis 2 An observation regarding controllability classification <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 20<\/td>\n | External measures General Example of vehicle-dependent external measures 1 Example of vehicle-dependent external measures 2 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 21<\/td>\n | Example of combining safety goals Introduction General Function definition Safety goals applying to the same hazard in different situat Hazard analysis and risk assessment <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 22<\/td>\n | Safety goals elaboration Safety process requirement structure – Flow and sequence of <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 25<\/td>\n | Concerning hardware development The classification of random hardware faults General Single-point fault Residual fault <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 26<\/td>\n | Detected dual-point fault Perceived dual-point fault Latent dual-point fault <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 27<\/td>\n | Safe fault Flow diagram for fault classification and fault class contri <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 30<\/td>\n | How to consider the failure rate of multiple-point faults re Example of residual failure rate and local single-point faul General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 31<\/td>\n | Technical safety requirement for sensor A_Master <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 32<\/td>\n | Description of the safety mechanism <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 35<\/td>\n | Evaluation of example 1 described in Figure\u00a011 General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 37<\/td>\n | Case 1: Sensor stuck-at value m > m2 fault <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 38<\/td>\n | Case 2: Sensor stuck-at value m < m1 fault <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 39<\/td>\n | Case 3: Sensor stuck-at value m \u2208 [m1, m2] fault <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 42<\/td>\n | Final residual failure rate assessment Improvement of SPFMSensor Further explanation concerning hardware How to deal with microcontrollers in the context of ISO\u00a02626 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 43<\/td>\n | Safety analysis methods Consideration of exposure duration in the calculation of Pro <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 44<\/td>\n | Safety element out of context Safety element out of context development <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 45<\/td>\n | Use cases General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 46<\/td>\n | Development of a system as a safety element out of context <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 47<\/td>\n | Step 1a \u2013 Definition of the scope of SEooC <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 48<\/td>\n | Step 1b \u2013 Assumptions on safety requirements for the SEooC Step 2 \u2013 Development of the SEooC Step 3 \u2013 Work products Step 4 \u2013 Integration of the SEooC into the item Development of a hardware component as a safety element out General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 49<\/td>\n | Step 1 \u2013 Assumptions on system level Step 1a \u2013 Assumptions on technical safety requirements <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 50<\/td>\n | Step 1b \u2013 Assumptions on system-level design Step 2 \u2013 Execution of hardware development Step 3 \u2013 Work products Step 4 \u2013 Integration of the SEooC into the item <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 52<\/td>\n | Development of a software component as a safety element out General Step 1a \u2013 Assumptions on the scope of the software component <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 53<\/td>\n | Step 1b \u2013 Assumptions on the safety requirements of the soft Step 2 \u2013 Development of the software component Step 3 \u2013 Integration of the software component in a new part An example of proven in use argument General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 54<\/td>\n | Item definition and definition of the proven in use candidat Change analysis Target values for proven in use <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 55<\/td>\n | Concerning ASIL decomposition Objective of ASIL decomposition Description of ASIL decomposition An example of ASIL decomposition General Item definition <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 56<\/td>\n | Hazard analysis and risk assessment Associated safety goal Preliminary architecture and safety concept General Purpose of the elements (initial architecture) Functional safety concept General <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n | ||||||
| 57<\/td>\n | Evolved safety concept of the item <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Road vehicles. Functional safety – Guideline on ISO 26262<\/b><\/p>\n |